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INTRODUCTION 
In 1959, Mrs. Ethel West Cotnam of Alabama won a ground­
breaking lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service when the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals allowed her to subtract her legal fees, paid to 
her lawyer on a contingency basis, from her gross income.1 Mrs. 
Cotnam sued the estate of her former employer when the administra­
tor refused to honor the decedent's promise to pay her one-fifth of his 
estate if she would care for him the rest of his life.2 Upon the success­
ful disposition of this suit,3 the Supreme Court of Alabama awarded 
Mrs. Cotnam $120,000.4 Of that amount, $50,365.83 went to her attor-
1. Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119. 126 (Sth Cir. 1959). 
2. Her employer, T. Shannon Hunter, died intestate. Id. at 1 20. 
3. Mrs. Cotnam successfully fended off allegations Mr. Hunter never made the promise, 
and that, if he did, part of her duties were sexual in nature. Id. at 1 2 1  n.2. 
4. Id. at 121. 
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ney, and the Internal Revenue Service determined she owed 
$36,985.02 in taxes.5 The Tax Court upheld this decision.6 Mrs. Cotnam 
appealed, claiming she possessed no control over the funds diverted to 
her attorney, and that, once she signed the contingent-fee contract,7 
she never could lay claim to the money.8 In a two-to-one decision, the 
Fifth Circuit agreed, reasoning that, because Mrs. Cotnam never · 
enjoyed the benefit of this alleged income, it in fact did not constitute 
income as to her.9 This decision created a split between the circuits10 
that has irked the Internal Revenue Service and a majority on the Tax 
Court to this day. 1 1  
For nearly forty years, the Fifth Circuit stood alone in holding that 
plaintiffs can subtract attorneys' fees from gross income.12 The major­
ity of circuit courts, less sympathetic to those in Mrs. Cotnam's posi­
tion, 13 distinguished her case based on the unique attributes of the 
attorney charging-lien statute under which her lawyers collected.14 In 
their view, a contingent-fee agreement constitutes nothing more than 
an anticipatory assignment of income, whereby the taxpayer transfers 
his or her right to income to someone else in order to decrease tax 
liability. 15 The taxpayer remains firmly in control of the income-
5. Cotnam v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 947 ( 1957). 
6. Id. 
7. A contingent fee is defined as "[a] fee charged for a lawyer's services only if the 
lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of court. Contingent fees are usu[ally] calcu­
lated as a percentage of the client's net recovery (such as 25% of the recovery if the case is 
settled, and 33% if the case is won at trial). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (7th ed. 1 999). 
8. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 25.  
9. See id. 
10. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 1 14 T.C. 399, 408 (2000) (hereinafter Kenseth I] (listing cir­
cuit court decisions where the I RS pursued arguments similar to the one used in Cotnam and 
prevailed). 
11 .  See id. at 408-12 (expounding at length on the continued wisdom of the tax court's 
original position). 
12. The Eleventh Circuit, created when the old Fifth Circuit was split into the current 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, remains bound by the pre-split Fifth Circuit precedents such as 
Cotnam. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 981 ) (en bane). 
13. The First. Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits all rejected similar ap­
proaches by taxpayers. See Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001); Coady v. 
Comm'r, 2 1 3  F.3d 1 187 (9th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. I nternal Revenue Service, 72 F.3d 938 
(1st Cir. 1 995); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Bagley v. Comm'r. 105 
T.C. 396, 418-19 (1995) (holding without mentioning Cotnam that settlement portion paid to 
attorneys pursuant to contingent fee was income to client), affd 1 21 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1 997); 
O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707 (1962), aff d 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963). 
14. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 1 4  T.C. at 408-09 (claiming Judge Wisdom's opinion 
rested on the language of the Alabama statute). The Alabama statute in question gives 
attorneys the same rights as their clients in regard to collecting judgments. See ALA. CODE 
§ 64 ( 1940). In general, such attorney charging-lien laws displace the common-law liens de­
scribed in footnote 24, infra. 
1 5. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001) (hereinafter Kenseth II]; Coady, 
213 F.3d at 1191; Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 14 T.C. at 411 n.5; O'Brien, 38 T.C. at 712. 
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generating vehicle, the lawsuit, and merely directs the proceeds to 
another, either in order to satisfy a debt,16 or to divert the funds to 
someone in a lower tax bracket.'7 Under such an analysis, taxpayers do 
possess dominion over the portion of their awards going toward legal 
fees. They have simply chosen to direct these ·proceeds to others in 
order to settle debts or lower their tax burden.18 Although taxing suc­
cessful litigants in this manner may seem unfair, a number of circuits 
have made it clear that, because Congress remains in control of tax 
policy, the courts should not make ad hoc adjustments in an attempt to 
promote equity.19 
Rejecting this analysis, the Sixth Circuit, in 2000, decided to follow 
Cotnam v. Commissioner0 in Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. 
United States,21 stating to do otherwise would constitute double 
taxation.22 The Estate of Clarks court noted that, in the anticipatory 
assignment of income cases cited by other courts, the Internal 
Revenue Service either taxed the donor or the donee, but not both.23 
Significantly, though 'the panel briefly discussed the Alabama attorney 
charging-lien statute, Michigan, where Estate of Clarks originated, has 
only a common law attorney lien, not a statute.24 Attributing no great 
16. Justice Stone condemned such arrangements, reasoning that, even if the money 
never came within the taxpayer's physical control, he nevertheless determined the fate of 
this income. See Helvering v. Horst, 3 1 1  U.S. 112, 1 16 ( 1940). 
17. See id. at 1 14  (diverting funds to a son in a lower tax bracket); Lucas v. Earl, 281 
U.S. ll I, 114- 15  ( 1930) (attempting to split husband's income between husband and wife 
before paying taxes). 
18. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 1 16 (stating that taxpayers realize a gain when they exchange 
the power to receive income for something of economic worth). 
1 9. See Kenseth II, supra note 15, 259 F.3d at 885; Chapman v. Comm'r, 618 F.2d 856, 
874 (Isl Cir. 1980); Nassau Lens Co. v. Comm'r, 308 F.2d 39, 45-46 (2nd Cir. 1962): 
Darren J. Campbell, Comment, Wiping the Slate Clean: An Examination on How a Court's 
Characterization of Contingent Attorney's Fees Implicates the Alternative Minimum Tax and 
Affects the Taxpayers, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 171, 200 (2001) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit 
violated the separation of powers doctrine when it misapplied federal tax law to alleviate the 
harsh results to the taxpayer); see also Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 653 (1949) 
(condemning courts that try to mold tax policy); Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 407 
(noting the dangers in judicial modification of established tax law principles). 
20. 263 F.2d 1 19 (5th Cir. 1959). 
2 1 .  202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000). 
22. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857. 
23. See id. 
24. hi. at 856. The common law attorney lien: 
was a device invented by the courts for the protection of attorneys against the knavery of 
their clients, by disabling clients from receiving the fruits of recoveries without paying for 
the valuable services by which the recoveries were obtained. The lien was never enforced 
like other liens. If the fund recovered was in possession or under the control of the court, it 
would not allow the client to obtain it until he had paid his attorney. and in administering the 
fund it would see that the attorney was protected. If the thing recovered was in a judgment, 
and notice of the attorney's claim had been given, the court would not allow the judgment to 
be paid to the prejudice of the attorney. 
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weight to this issue, the court noted, "Michigan law operates in more 
or less the same way as the Alabama lien in Cotnam."25 Thus, the court 
refused to require any statutory grant of power to the plaintiff's attor­
ney over the j udgment award before finding that the plaintiff lacked 
sufficient control over the portion paid to the attorney to avoid tax on 
this amount. 
Another significant decision in 2000 arose in Srivastava v. 
Commissioner26 when the Fifth Circuit considered a Texas case and 
refused to limit Cotnam to Alabama.27 The Internal Revenue Service 
sought to isolate Alabama residents as the only taxpayers entitled to 
take advantage of the Cotnam decision.28 The panel found the differ­
ences in the Texas and Alabama attorney charging laws irrelevant in 
regard to the taxpayer-plaintiff.29 The sole consideration before the 
court in regard to the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine con­
sisted of the "degree of control and dominion over the asset."30 Find­
ing Cotnam controlling in this case, the panel concluded that a 
contingent-fee agreement constitutes a significant shift of control from 
the plaintiff to the attorney.31 
This Note argues that plaintiffs assign a portion of their cause of 
action to their attorneys when they sign contingent-fee agreements. 
Part I argues the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is inap­
plicable to contingent-fee agreements. Part II contends the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits have already implicitly held that plaintiffs assign a 
portion of their claims to their attorneys upon signing contingent­
fee agreements, and explains why this approach is correct. Part III 
concludes that section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code - property 
transferred in connection with performance of services - is ill suited 
to contingent-fee arrangements, and supports a barter analysis for 
determining the tax liability of each party. 
Id. (quoting RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 116, at 559 (2d 
ed. 1955) in tum quoting Goodrich v. McDonald, 19 N.E. 649 (N.Y. 1889) (internal quota­
tion marks omitted)). 
25. Id. 
26. 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000). 
27. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 364-65 (stating the Commissioner's belief that Cotnam should 
be distinguished because the Alabama statute gave attorneys more power to enforce their 
rights than the Texas statute did). 
28. See id. at 363. 
29. See id. at 363-64. 
30. Id. 
31 .  Id. at 364-65. The court, however. also announced that what the attorney's rights 
were had no bearing on the situation. Id. 
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I .  (MIS)APPLYING THE ANTICIPATORY ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME 
DOCTRINE 
This Part examines the anticipatory assignment of income theory 
applied by courts in the majority from two perspectives - paying off a 
debt by assigning income previously earned, and the actual enjoyment 
of the income test - and finds both inapplicable to contingent-fee 
situations. Section I.A argues that a contingent-fee agreement does 
not pay off a debt in such a way as to trigger the anticipatory assign­
ment of income doctrine. Section l.B contends that whether or not the 
taxpayer enjoys the income should be irrelevant to a court's holding, 
and reveals that the courts actually disagree on whether the taxpayer 
realizes the income. 
A. Lack of an Assignment Satisfying a Debt 
For over seventy years courts have policed transactions with an eye 
toward preventing tax evasion in the guise of transferred assets.32 
Justice Holmes first enunciated the anticipatory assignment of income 
doctrine in Lucas v. Earl,33 concluding "tax[ation] . . .  [can]not be 
escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully 
[sic] devised."34 The dissent in Cotnam itself asserted that such 
language should prevent successful plaintiffs from using contingent-fee 
arrangements with their lawyers to avoid paying income taxes on these 
amounts.35 Later courts have advocated this position insisting that to 
allow such results would permit litigants to avoid taxation.36 Courts use 
phrases such as "but for the taxpayer's effort to shift the receipt" of 
the proceeds of the lawsuit, the taxpayer would have come into the 
entire amount. 37 Other ways, however, exist to interpret Lucas in these 
situations. 
In fact, one can easily distinguish Lucas and its progeny from the 
typical arrangement in a contingent-fee case.38 As others have noted, 
32. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 1 1 1 , 115 (1930) (establishing the assignment of 
income doctrine). 
33. Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 1 4  T.C. 399, 41 1 n.5 (2000) (recounting the origins of the 
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine). 
34. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 1 1 5. 
35. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 1 19, 126-27 (5th Cir. 1959) (Wisdom, J., dissent· 
ing). 
36. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 413-14 (stating that anticipatory assignment 
by the taxpayer of the proceeds of the lawsuit must be included in the taxpayer's gross 
income); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707, 7 12  ( 1962) (insisting that Lucas applies even if the 
taxpayer is not entitled to the attorney's part of the award for a split second). 
37. Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 1 4  T.C. at 417. 
38. Id. at 417 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (detailing ways to distinguish assignment of income 
cases). 
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"it is not clear that the rationale of the assignment of income cases 
should apply to contingency-based attorneys' fees."39 This implication 
arises because of what the Lucas Court sought to prevent.40 When 
Justice Holmes referred to "skillfully devised contracts to avoid paying 
wealth,"41 he meant just that. Mr. Earl attempted to reduce his income 
tax liability by relying on a contract with his wife to share all wealth, 
however acquired, equally.42 The Court refused to allow contractual 
arrangements to shift the tax burden from the source of the income.43 
Unlike arrangements meant to reduce tax liability, contingent-fee 
agreements do not attribute income to anything other than the source 
of the income.44 Plaintiffs do not hire lawyers with the goal of avoiding 
taxation on the money due them by transferring a portion of their 
claims to their lawyers as a gratuity.45 Some, such as the dissenters in 
Cotnam, argue these arrangements amount to an anticipatory assign­
ment of income because they discharge a debt to the client's attor­
ney.46 This argument misconstrues the contingent-fee arrangement. 
Attorneys have no recourse against their clients when seeking pay­
ment until the defendant makes good on the judgment. When plain­
tiffs prevail, their attorneys look solely to their portion of the judg­
ment, not to their client's. In fact, the whole structure of the 
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine rests on the notion that 
the taxpayer would have received the income, but for the assignment.47 
Here, but for the assignment, neither would have received the income 
39. Thad Austin Davis, Note, Cotnam v. Commissioner and the Income Tax Treatment 
of Contingency-Based Attorneys' Fees - The Alabama Attorney's Charging Lien Meets 
Lucas v. Earl Head-on, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1683, 1706 (2000). 
40. See Davis, supra note 39, at 1 706 (claiming the Lucas Court was concerned only with 
abusive assignments of income). 
41. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 ,  1 15 (1930). 
42 Id. at 114. It should be noted that the Earls' contract was not one of the "carefully 
devised plots" of which Justice Holmes warned. They formed the contract approximately 
seventeen years before Congress implemented the federal income tax. See Lauren E. 
Sheridan, Note, Trees in the Orchard or Fruit From the Trees?: The Case for Excluding 
Attorneys' Contingent Fees from the Client's Gross Income, 36 GA. L. REV. 283, 291 (2001 ). 
43. See Lucas, 281 U.S. at 115. 
44. See Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (noting purpose not to shift tax liability). 
45. As those wishing to distinguish Lucas frequently note, most, if not all, anticipatory 
assignment of income cases involve transfers between family members, or between debtors 
and creditors. See, e.g., id. 
46. See Davis, supra note 39, at 1703 (discussing dissenter's reasoning). 
47. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1940) (stating, but for the taxpayer's 
transfer of interest coupons to his son, the taxpayer would have received the interest); Coady 
v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1 187, 1 191 (9th Cir. 2000) (but for diversion of funds to her creditor -
the lawyer - the taxpayer would have received the money); Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 
T.C. 399, 417-18 (2000) (Chabot, J., dissenting) (reciting the origin of the assignment of 
income line of cases). 
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because payment would not have been forthcoming. Simply put, the 
"skillfully devised" scheme arises from an attempt to collect the 
money, not an attempt to avoid taxation.48 Thus, the correct analysis of 
contingent-fee agreements does not involve the anticipatory assign­
ment of income doctrine. 
Considering what role the attorney plays in recovery clarifies the 
objections to applying the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine 
in these situations.49 While the client may have earned the right to the 
income, collecting these funds requires an attorney's efforts.50 The 
lawyer earns the contingent fee through skill and judgment.51 Taxes 
should accrue only to those who earn the money.52 Nominal owners 
who serve as funnels without real access to the money should not 
suffer _the taxation of such "income."53 This proposition holds the most 
sway in areas such as punitive damages.54 Though detractors maintain 
an attorney does not earn any part of the award,55 they surely cannot 
claim the plaintiff "earns" punitive damages either.56 Such payments 
48. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 2000) (speculating the goal is 
to secure an attorney's services without putting capital at risk, not the avoidance of taxa­
tion); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (assigning part of the claim to 
obtain legal services is not within the doctrine of Lucas v. Earl); cf. Kenseth l, supra note 10, 
1 14 T.C. at 409-10 (listing and explaining contingent-fee cases but holding assignment of 
income doctrine still applies). Bllf see Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(claiming Lucas was concerned with skillfully devising the method of payment); Robinson v. 
Comm'r, 102 T.C. 11 6, 11 7 (1994) (condemning settlement purposefully coordinated with 
the defendant in order to reduce taxes). 
49. Cf. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856-58 (reviewing case law and emphasizing attor-
ney's role). 
50. See id. at 857. 
5 1. !ti. at 858. 
52. Kenseth /, supra note 10, 1 14 T.C. at 413-14. 
53. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 , 573 (1978) (stating that the Court 
"looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular 
form the parties employed"); Escobar v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1326 (1983); Davis, 
supra note 39, at 1703. 
54. Cf. Kenseth /, supra note 10, 1 14  T.C. at 447-48 (Beghe, J., dissenting). 
[T]he recovery is determined in a dynamic process in which the exercise of the experience 
and skill of the attorney results both in some recovery and in an increase in the value of that 
recovery. The attorney creates and adds value; the efforts of the attorney contribute to -
indeed he may be solely responsible for - both the recovery and its augmentation. Attenu­
ated subtleties and refinements of title have nothing to do with the practical realities of con­
tingent fee agreements and the relative interests of attorney and client in any recovery that 
may ultimately be realized. 
Id. (Beghe, J., dissenting); Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiffs Windfall from 
Punitive Damages Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1909 (1992) (hereinafter Plaintiffs 
Windfall] (claiming that attorneys are attracted to punitive damages cases because of a 
desire to capture the windfall). 
55. Kenseth l, supra note 10, 1 14 T.C. at 413. 
56. See Plaintiffs Windfall, supra note 54, at 1903 (describing punitive damages as wind­
falls). 
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result from the defendant's, not the plaintiff's, past acts or omissions.57 
The augmentation of the award above the plaintiff's actual damages 
results from the attorney's efforts in the suit.58 The plaintiff did not 
"earn" the punitive damages, and, between the client and the attorney, 
if either one can be said to have earned them, it was the attorney. 
B. Enjoyment of Income 
When read properly, Helvering v. Horst59 is distinguishable from 
the contingent-fee line of cases. In an effort to clarify what constitutes 
a taxable event, the Supreme Court created a trap for the unwary. In 
Horst, the Supreme Court noted that the complaining taxpayer 
enjoyed his income by transferring the interest co.upons.from bonds to 
his son, just as surely as if he would have retained the income bearing 
instruments for himself.60 The Court took pains to point out that a 
taxpayer could enjoy income "when he has made such use or disposi­
tion of his power to receive or control the income as to procure in its 
place other satisfactions which are of economic worth."61 This state­
ment led many courts into the thicket of trying to determine whether 
or not taxpayers truly enjoyed their alleged income, or whether in fact 
someone else had dominion over the money.62 This inquiry miscon-
strues the Court's reasoning in Horst. 
· 
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits particularly have insisted on unneces­
sarily debating whether taxpayers enjoyed their income under the 
meaning of Horst.63 For example, in Estate of Clarks the Sixth Circuit 
noted that in Horst and Lucas "the income assigned to the assignee 
was already earned, vested and relatively certain to be paid to the 
assignor."64 From here, the argument proceeds, because the plaintiff's 
enjoyment of the income depended upon the lawyer winning the 
57. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart 
Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REV. 953, 955-56 (1986); Plaintiffs Windfall, supra note 54. at 
1 903. 
58. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 14  T.C. at 447-48 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (attributing 
increase to attorney's experience and skill). 
59. 31 1  U.S. 1 12 (1940). 
60. Helvering, 311 U.S. at 1 17. 
61. lei. at 1 1 6. 
62. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing who controls 
the income producing source); Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 
F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 1 19, 126 (5th Cir. 1 959) 
(reasoning that, because Mrs. Cotnam had not fully enjoyed the benefit of her economic 
gain, she did not realize the gain). 
63. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126. 
64. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857. 
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lawsuit and earning any fee received, the plaintiff could not possibly 
have enjoyed the income by assigning it to the lawyer.65 
The majority of circuit courts have correctly noted this argument 
has little to do with whether the lawyer's fee was income as to the 
taxpayer.66 Few categorize the paying of bills as an enjoyable activity, 
yet that is not the point. The outcome should hinge on whether 
taxpayers control the flow of funds, no matter that they could not 
rightly deem many of these payments discretionary.67 Under such an 
analysis, the Internal Revenue Service should prevail.68 But in truth, 
this debate centers on when a taxpayer realizes income, which is what 
the Horst Court attempted to define.69 Trying to figure out when 
someone enjoys the benefit of the economic gain70 amounts to an 
attempt at objectively determining if the taxpayer controls it.71 Thus, 
those circuits applying the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine 
believe that if taxpayers can direct the funds to their lawyers, they 
obviously control those funds.72 Those critical of such an approach 
maintain this criteria falls short of satisfying the complete "dominion 
over the asset" language in the Supreme Court's Glenshaw Glass73 
decision.74 The Fifth Circuit in Cotnam found it dismaying to argue 
Mrs. Cotnam controlled an asset when she could only apply the "gain" 
from it to a single, and not very attractive situation.75 The taxpayer's 
options consisted of exchanging a fraction of the amount due for a 
chance to reclaim the whole amount, or retaining a worthless, albeit 
65. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 361 ; Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 
1 25-26. 
66. See Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1 187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that not directly 
receiving payment from obligor does not prevent full enjoyment of the benefit). 
67. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1191 (procuring payment directly to creditors cannot prevent 
taxation); Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. 399, 409 (2000) (listing cases where the I RS pre­
vailed under this theory). 
68. Cf Co"dy, 213 F.3d at 1 191 ; Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 409- 10. 
69. Helvering v. Horst, 3 11 U.S. 112, 1 1 5-16 ( 1940). 
70. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 359; Coady, 213 F.3d at 1 191; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126. 
71. See Horst, 311  U.S. at 116. This led some to ask if the plaintiff acts merely as a 
remote, or proximate, owner. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 39 at 1702. 
72 See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (noting the taxpayer benefited 
through prosecution of her claim). 
73. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (finding the taxpayer liable 
for taxes because the gain had clearly been recognized and the taxpayer had complete 
dominion over it). 
74. See Davis, supra note 39, at 1691; cf Benjamin C. Rasmussen, Note, Taxation of an 
Attorney's Contingency Fee of a Punitive Damage Recovery: The Srivastava Appro11ch, 15 
BYU J.  PUB. L. 301,  301 (2001) (framing the question as whether an undeniable accession to 
wealth occurred, clearly realized, with the taxpayer having complete dominion). 
75. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 25. 
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complete, right to the asset.76 Therefore, even though the taxpayer 
could direct to whom the potential proceeds would go, she had not yet 
realized the gain, and once the gain did occur, the contingent-fee 
portion was beyond her control. "It seems intuitive that when the goal 
of a tax system is to subject net income to taxation, expenditures used 
to produce that income should be [deductible]."77 
The disagreement over the nature of a contingent-fee agreement 
does not, however, end with the anticipatory assignment of income 
doctrine, or the requisite level of control to establish dominion. The 
Seventh Circuit failed to acknowledge the controversy involving 
whether a contingent-fee agreement assigns a portion of the daim 
when Mr. Kenseth, the plaintiff in Kenseth v. Commissioner,78 ap­
pealed the decision of the Tax Court.79 In summarizing the 
taxpayer's claim, the court wrote: :•1n essence, Kenseth wants us to 
recharacterize this as a case in which he assigned 40 percent of his tort 
claim to the law firm. But he didn't. A contingent-fee contract is not 
an assignment."80 Despite the confident tone of this proclamation, the 
status of contingency-fee contracts remains a matter of much conten­
tion.81 Upon closer analysis, the circuits in the minority view 
contingent-fee agreements as coming harrowingly close to doing just 
that - assigning a part of the claim.82 In light of their opinions, they 
apparently feel such agreements cross the line. 
76. Id. at 126. 
77. Carol Duane Olson, Toward a Neutral Definition of "Trade or Business" in the 
Internal Revenue Code, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1199, 1210-11 (1986). I.R.C. § 162 (1999) imple­
ments such an approach for businesses. 
78. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. 399, 412 n.6 (2000) (dismissing the possibility 
of an assignment with minimal discussion); Recent Case, Seventh Circuit Holds that 
Contingent Attorneys' Fees Must Be Included in a Taxpayer's Gross Income, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2357, 2361 (2002) (claiming the Kenseth II court "failed to appreciate the reality of 
contingent fee arrangements as transferring substantive ownership of a portion of a claim"). 
79. See Kenseth II, supra note 15, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). 
80. Id. at 882. 
81. See, e.g., Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1 995) (referring to a 
contingency-fee contract as a vehicle of assignment); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a 
Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 625, 639-44 (1995). Few commentators or courts analyze the issue; most simply make 
ipse dixit statements then move on. But see Recent Case, supra note 78, at 2362 (applying a 
burdens-benefits analysis and concluding the attorney displays many of the indicia of owner­
ship). 
82. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing assignment as 
a division of property); Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 
857 (6th Cir. 2000) (characterizing what the lawyer received as an assignment); Cotnam v. 
Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) ("[S]he, in effect, assigned to her attorneys forty 
percent of the claim . . . .  "). 
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IL IF IT LOOKS LIKE AN ASSIGNMENT, WALKS LIKE AN 
ASSIGNMENT, AND QUACKS LIKE AN ASSIGNMENT . . .  
This Part analyzes the opinions finding the lawyer's contingency 
fee outside of the plaintiff's income. Section II.A concludes that the 
Fifth and Sixth Circuits, while avoiding saying so explicitly,S3 have con­
cluded contingency-fee agreements amount to a partial assignment of 
the claim. Section 11.B offers support for ruling contingency-fee 
agreements are partial assignments by considering the features of the 
contingency-fee agreement. 
A. The Indications of a Partial Assignment 
The proper categorization of contingent-fee agreements remains 
unclear, despite pronouncements to the contrary. Though the Seventh 
Circuit stated that a contingent-fee agreement is not a partial assign­
ment of the claim, it did not arrive at this conclusion through an inde­
pendent analysis.84 Instead, the opinion points out that Wisconsin law 
prohibits the assignment of a claim to a lawyer.85 Many states do so 
because the common law barred the assignment of a cause of action.86 
Originally, such bars were meant to prevent the rich and landed 
nobility from harassing others by financing lawsuits.87 When contin­
gent-fee agreements first arose, the judiciary predominantly found 
such agreements champertous.88 Although later jurisprudence decided 
contingent-fee agreements were sufficiently distinguishable from 
83. The Cotnam court came very close to holding so explicitly. See 263 F.2d at 125. 
84. The court cited to Young for this proposition. Kenseth II, supra note 1 5, 259 F.3d at 
884. 
85. Kenseth II, supra note 15 ,  259 F.3d at 883-84. But see Recent Case, supra note 78, at 
2361 (asserting that the court misread the applicable Wisconsin law because of its failure to 
read the comments following the ethical rule the court utilized in its interpretation). See 
generally Rebecca L. Morlock, Note, Bowen v. American Family Insurance Group; An 
Unsettling Change in South Dakota Subrogation Law, 4 1  S.D. L. REV. 335 (1996) (discussing 
whether subrogation amounts to an assignment of the claim and citing to cases where courts 
found that it does). 
86. Painter, supra note 81 ,  at 631, 639. Biii see Amy E. Douthitt, Comment, Selling Your 
Attorney's Negligence: Should Legal Malpractice Claims Be Assignable in Texas?, 47 
BAYLOR L. REV. 177. 180 (1 995) ("The general common law rule of nonassignability of a 
cause of action never applied in Texas."). 
87. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court; The Sanctioning of 
Contingency Fee Contracts, History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 ,  232-33 ( 1998). 
88. Champerty is defined as: "I. An agreement between a stranger to a lawsuit and a 
litigant by which the stranger pursues the litigant's claim as consideration for receiving part 
of any judgement proceeds. 2. The act or fact of maintaining, supporting, or promoting 
another person's lawsuit." BLACK 'S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (7th ed. 1999). 
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champerty, the courts never established a principle on which to differ­
entiate between them.89 
In opinions granting taxpayers relief from being taxed on their 
attorneys' contingent fees, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits obscure the 
true import of their holdings by couching their arguments in terms 
meant to fend off attacks under Lucas and Horst.90 The opinions 
frequently refer to whether the taxpayer had any right to the income 
when it was assigned.91 Thus, the Sixth Circuit notes "the value of the 
taxpayer's lawsuit was entirely speculative and dependent on the 
services of counsel,"92 while the Fifth Circuit finds it important that the 
taxpayer "was a long way from having the equivalent of cash," and it 
"was uncertain as to whether it [the claim] had any value."93 
In fact, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have implicitly held that plain­
tiffs assign a portion of their claim to the attorney upon signing a 
contingent-fee agreement.94 This can be difficult to discern from the 
cases, given that the courts themselves often seem confused about the 
basis and impact of their holdings.95 The Fifth Circuit in Cotnam came 
close to explicitly recognizing an assignment when it stated the 
taxpayer "in effect, assigned to her attorneys forty percent of the 
claim."96 The "in effect" language, however, indicates the court's 
unwillingness to state flatly that a partial assignment of the claim had 
occurred.97 In Estate of Clarks, the Sixth Circuit used a less direct ap­
proach stating "the client as assignor has transferred some of the 
89. See Karsten, supra note 87, at 240 (recounting how states allowed contingency fees 
by statute but kept champerty Jaws); Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An 
Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 58-59 (2000) (de­
scribing what the champerty doctrine prohibits but claiming exceptions have been common 
place); Robert N. Amkraut, Note and Comment, Taxing Contingency Fee Attorneys as 
Investors: Recognizing the Modern Reality, 71 WASH. L. REV. 745, 752 ( 1996) (discussing 
practical reasons why champerty faded in regard to contingent-fee agreements but offering 
no theoretical grounds for the exception). Largely, it seems courts simply ignored the matter 
when it was expeditious to do so. In fact, Maine barred contingent-fee lawsuits up until 1965, 
though few champerters likely were prosecuted. See Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process 
Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyer's Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 
371, 372 n.6 (1998). 
90. See Estate of Clarks ex rel Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (discussing extensively the import of these cases); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 
1 19, 125�26 (5th Cir. 1959) (same). 
91. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125-26. 
92. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857. 
93. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125. 
94. See Gregg D. Polsky, Taxing Contingent Attorney's Fees: Many Courts Are Getting It 
Wrong, 89 TAX NOTES 91 7, 919 (2000) (claiming that these courts found an assignment of 
income). 
95. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text. 
96. Comam, 263 F.2d at 125. 
97. Id. 
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trees in his orchard."98 When the Fifth Circuit revisited the issue in 
Srivastava, its reasoning was considerably less clear. After discussing 
assignment in general, the court stated "control over that claim - the 
income source or 'tree' - is neither fully divested to the attorney nor 
fully retained by the taxpayer-client."99 This effort to characterize the 
transaction as a tenancy in common, after earlier having called it an 
assignment,100 only serves to confuse the issue. The Estate of Clarks 
court made a similar effort, indicating the attorney and the client had 
formed a partnership in order to prosecute the claim. 1 01 
Whatever their reasoning, these courts clearly reject the idea that 
an assignment of income occurred, 1 02 unless one concludes that these 
courts do not think assigned income taxable unless done in an antici­
patory fashion meant to avoid taxation. The only coherent theory rests 
on the plaintiff exchanging a portion of her claim for her attorney's 
services. This theory, however, presents a problem. States other than 
Wisconsin still legally bar attorneys from receiving an assignment of 
part of the claim. io3 In fact, the bar was almost universal throughout 
the legal systems descended from the English common law.104 
Describing these transfers, when the law apparently bars categorizing 
them as partial assignments, remains a dilemma. 
Faced with this quandary, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have sided 
with reality, treating the contingent-fee agreement as a partial 
transfer. The well-intentioned but dubious notion that preventing law­
yers from acquiring causes of action will reduce frivolous lawsuits 
against the innocent1 05 should not impede the use of contingency­
fee agreements. Many potential plaintiffs with a valid cause of action 
98. Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 
2000) (utilizing the tree analogy from Lucas). In Lucas. Justice Holmes attacked arrange­
ments "by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew." 
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 1 1 1 ,  1 1 5  (1930). Subsequent cases have attempted to determine if the 
trees themselves, or solely the fruit have been transferred. See, e.g. , Estate of Clarks, 202 
F.3d at 858. 
99. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2000). 
100. See id. at 360. 
101.  Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858. 
102. Id. at 857; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 25. 
1 03. See, e.g. , Drake v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 1 65 A.2d 452, 453 (Del. Ch. 1960). 
Apparently the fear is if lawyers could sue on others' causes of action, frivolous litigation 
would increase because lawyers would sue in situations where those actually injured would 
not. See id. at 454; Amkraut, supra note 89, at 75 1 -52. But, as applied, this results in a very 
narrow ban. New York seems mainly concerned that lawyers will take cases involving 
minimal damages and try to profit by forcing the defendant to pay huge legal fees. See 
Drake, 1 65 A.2d at 453-54. 
104. See Martin, supra note 89, at 75-79 (discussing champerty laws in Canada and 
Australia); Painter, supra note 81, at 639 (stating that champerty, including contingent-fee 
agreements, is still illegal in England). 
105. See Martin, supra note 89, at 58 (describing the intent behind champerty doctrines). 
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cannot afford the great cost of litigating the matter in court.106 For the 
legal system to fulfill its societal function it must hold wrongdoers 
accountable for their actions.1 07 Access to justice requires the 
availability of contingent-fee agreements, as does the State's ability to 
influence behavior through the granting of private rights of action.1 08  
S o  i n  the name of equity, and i n  the interest of society, courts give a 
wink and a nod toward contingent-fee contracts - and even enforce 
them.1 09 Courts do so despite the fact these contracts assign part of the 
claim and give attorneys rights even when, under a pure contingent­
fee agreement, they would have none. 1 1 0 
The best indicator that the partial assignment of the claim argu­
ment needs careful attention is how the courts that deny that a partial 
assignment occurred have insisted on treating the issue. They distin­
guish their opinions based, not on their dislike for the partial assign­
ment of the claim legality,1 1 1  but on how the state in question applies 
its attorney lien laws.1 12 This effort to distinguish Cotnam has led many 
observers astray. One adherent of the majority approach meticulously 
analyzed each state's attorney-charging statute to predict whether 
Cotnam might apply there.1 13  This analysis included a section stating 
106. Karsten, supra note 87, at 239-42; Martin, supra note 89, at 58; Schneyer, supra note 
89, at 376. 
107. See Schneyer, supra note 89, at 376 (stating that contingent-fee agreements allow 
enforcement through liability rules thus easing the state's need for administrative rules). 
Professor Schneyer states that civil suits function not only to avoid injustice; they also allow 
the State to deter wrongful conduct by granting a private right of action in lieu of costly 
administrative rules or penal statues. Id. 
1 08. See Schneyer, supra note 89, at 376 (claiming elimination of contingent-fee agree,­
ments would weaken the State's power). 
109. See, e.g. , Kenseth II, supra note 1 5, 259 F.3d 881 ,  883-84 (7th Cir. 2001 ) (explaining 
that because attorneys are barred from acquiring ownership of a claim, an assignment of the 
claim obviously did not occur, and contingent-fee agreements do not offend champerty doc­
trines because they are equivalent to any other form of debt). 
1 10. See Painter, supra note 81 , at 640 ("[A) partial assignment of course occurs when a 
lawyer charges a contingent fee."); Donna A. Schneiter, Note, Attorney's Divorces: Are 
Their Pending Contingency Fee Cases Marital Assets or Not?, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 829, 840 
( 1999) ("[A] contingency fee contract is 'a valuable property right' even when the underlying 
case has not settled or been adjudicated."); see also Schneyer, supra note 89, at 376-77 
(claiming that lawyers are investing in claims). 
1 1 1 . The Young court specifically considered and rejected the proposition that a 
contingent-fee arrangement constitutes a partial assignment, but then went on to say 
Cotnam and Estate of Clarks relied on state law for their holdings. Young v. Comm'r, 240 
F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2001). 
1 1 2  See Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1 1 87, 1 190 (9th Cir. 2000) (pointing out Alaska's 
attorney lien statute grants no ownership interest to attorneys over the judgment); Kenseth I, 
supra note 1 0, 1 14 T.C. 399, 409 (2000) (stating that the tax court ignores the concurrence 
offered by Judges Rives and Brown despite the fact the dissenting judge wrote the holding 
itself); Davis, supra note 39 (exploring various courts' focus on the attorney lien issue); 
Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 3 10  (claiming the First, Ninth and Federal Circuits are espe­
cially likely to use this approach). 
1 13. See Davis, supra note 39. 
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that Texas lien laws were distinguishable, with a cite to the Tax 
Court's treatment of Srivastava.114 The analysis failed, not because the 
statutes are not distinguishable, but because, in truth, no one really 
cares about these statutes or their common law equivalents. These 
statutes merely provide courts a convenient means of distinguishing 
Cotnam without reaching the Fifth Circuit's problematic conclusion 
that contingent-fee agreements assign part of the claim. As the 
Kenseth I dissent pointed out, the courts have distinguished Cotnam 
on the narrow ground so often that they have obscured the broader 
holding.1 1 5  
Thus, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits almost completely disregard that 
which so many other courts feign so much interest in. On appeal, the 
Srivastava Court found Cotnam indistinguishable from the case at bar, 
despite Texas attorneys' rights being wholly derivative of their clients' 
rights.11 6 As noted earlier, the Sixth Circuit in Estate of Clarks glossed 
over any differences in attorney-charging statutes saying Alabama's -
supposedly highly distinguishable11 7 - statute and Michigan's com­
mon law version were "more or less" the same.1 18 In fact, when 
Kenseth tried to use this approach with the Seventh Circuit, Judge 
Posner tartly replied that every state, to his knowledge, gave the 
attorney "a lien on the proceeds of any settlement or judgment to the 
extent of the contingent fee."1 19 
B. The Case for Partial Assignment of the Claim 
Because contingent-fee agreements transfer so much control over 
the handling of a claim, it is difficult to argue that the plaintiff trans­
fers a mere interest in the judgment to the attorney. The exact level of 
control an attorney exercises over a claim upon accepting a case 
1 1 4. Davis, supra note 39, at 1 7 1 6. 
115. The narrow ground being the specific statute at issue in Cotnam. Judge Beghe also 
noted the record remains unclear whether anyone even mentioned the Alabama statute in 
the Tax Court phase of the Cotnam saga. Kemeth I, supra note 10, 1 14  T.C. 399 at 434 n.34 
(2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting). 
1 1 6. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 364 n.33 (5th Cir. 2000). The dissent argued 
that the case was distinguishable from Cotnam on this basis. Id. at 367-68. (Dennis, J .. dis­
senting). One commentator believes the Fifth Circuit implicitly held no future decisions 
would be based on the attorney lien laws. See Polsky, supra note 94, at 918 n.1 6. 
1 17. Title 46, section 64 of the Code of Alabama allows the attorney's lien to attach 
when he files the complaint, rather than at judgment like other states. Davis, supra note 39, 
at 1 689-90. The attorney's lien also takes precedence over the plaintiffs set off and other 
liens, except tax liens. Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1 187 (9th Cir. 2000); Davis, supra note 39, 
at 1 687. 
118. Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 
2000). 
1 1 9. Kenseth II, supra note 15, 259 F.3d 881, 882 (7th Cir. 2001 ). 
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remains a subject of debate.120 The fact that the attorney gains a great 
deal of control at the signing of a contingent-fee contract, however, 
stands as a given. Those not qualified to press their own claims hire 
attorneys familiar with the system and capable of working within it to 
achieve a particular goal.121 The attorney is the expert in this situation, 
estimating the claim's worth,122 and determining how to handle discov­
ery and pretrial.123 The client will generally defer to the attorney on 
trial strategy, and even on whether or not to accept or reject settle­
ment offers.124 Clients generally do not have any concept of what a 
reasonable fee should be, or what the lawyer's fee will be in the end. 1 25  
Practically speaking, the attorney's d e  facto level o f  control i s  almost 
total. 
The counter argument that the ultimate control over the suit 
remains with the plaintiff-client fails to adequately consider the reality 
of the situation. Those who do not wish to view contingency-fee 
lawsuits as partial assignments of the claim dismiss lack of control 
arguments.126 They note clients retain ultimate control over the case 
because they can fire their attorneys if displeased with their efforts.127 
1 20. See Amkraut, supra note 89 at 763; Douthitt, supra note 86, at 183 (recounting the 
court's fear that clients lose control of litigation upon signing of contingent-fee agreement); 
Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Pho,enix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 ,  18 
(1984) (stating that the mystique of high stakes litigation deters control); Schneyer, supra 
note 89, at 374 (discussing the use of contingent-fee agreements to discourage the changing 
of counsel - thus retaining control of the litigation). 
121 .  Cf. Karsten, supra note 87, at 241 -42 (quoting historical material saying rights mean 
nothing without the ability to enforce them through legal representation). 
122 See Painter, supra note 81 , at 663-64, 691; cf. Schneyer. supra note 89, at 403 (im­
plying attorneys evaluate the worth of claims but withhold this estimate from clients); 
Amkraut, supra note 89 at 763 (treating lawyers as investors who use contingent-fee agree­
ments to get a good return on their investment). 
123. Cf. F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY OF 
PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 62 (1964) (claiming contingent fees give 
lawyers control of litigation); Richard M. Birnholz, Comment, The Validity and Propriety of 
Contingent Fee Controls, 37 UCLA L. REV. 949, 955 (1 990) (claiming that lawyers can con­
trol litigation because of clients' ignorance); Miller, supra note 1 20, at 18 (discussing pretrial 
hyperactivity which "keeps the meter running"); Schneyer, supra note 89, at 377, 394 
(accusing lawyers of shirking by pursuing clients' claims less vigorously than they should). 
124. See Kenseth I, supra note JO, 1 1 4  T.C. 399. 445 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting); 
MACKINNON, supra note 123 at 196 (maintaining lawyers control settlements and some 
plaintiffs never figure out what they got); Schneyer, supra note 89 at 389, 394; Philip J. 
Havers, Student Article, Take the Money and Run: Inherent Ethical Problems of the 
Contingency Fee and Loser Pays Systems, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 621, 
626 (2000). 
125. See Bimholz, supra note 123, at 954. 
126. See Kenseth II, supra note 15, 259 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001 ); Young v. Comm'r, 
240 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2001). 
1 27. See Young, 240 F.3d at 378; Amkraut, supra note 89, at 378; Douglas G. Hickel, 
Comment, Losing in the Tax System After You Win in the Court System: Should Contingent 
Fees Paid to the Attorney Be Included in the Taxpayer-Client's Gross Income?, 20 ST. LOUIS 
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Yet this right often proves illusory in practice. The contingent-fee 
lawyer dropped from a case does not go away empty handed.128 Courts 
routinely handle such situations by forcing the client to reimburse the 
fired attorney at an hourly rate for any work already done on the 
case.129 Other courts willingly enforce the contingent-fee contract, 
granting the lawyer whatever share the agreement calls for out of the 
final judgment. 130 One court went so far as to allow the lawyer to press 
the claim even after the client no longer wished to pursue it,131 while 
another stated if a partial assignment did occur, the attorney had a 
right against being discharged.132 To maintain that the client still re­
tains control in such situations reduces control to a theoretical, rather 
than an actual, right. Control is of little practical consequence when its 
exercise would cause two sets of lawyers' fees to eat up the entire 
award. Add to this the fact that the courts advocating the ultimate 
control theory also force taxpayers to pay taxes on both their share 
and the attorneys' contingent fees, and one can easily see why any 
client who needs the money in controversy cannot possibly afford to 
switch attorneys in most situations. 133 
To clarify the nature of these agreements, it proves useful to con­
sider how the contingent-fee contracts themselves address ownership 
of the claim issues. The contract at issue in Srivastava stated the client 
agreed to "sell, transfer, assign and convey to my said attorneys the re­
spective undivided interests in and to my said claim."134 Attorneys also 
routinely include language to retain control over settlement talks.135 
Because of a real possibility the lawyer's and client's interests will 
U. PUB. L. REV. 477, 487 (2001 ) (maintaining clients retain a high level of actual control be­
cause they can always discharge the lawyer). 
1 28. See MACKINNON, supra note 123, at 80 (claiming courts protect contingent-fee 
attorneys at clients' expense). 
129. See, e.g. , Chase v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) 
(holding attorney was entitled to actual and reasonable price for services); Phelps v. Elgin, 
184 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 962). 
1 30. See Phelps, 184 N.E.2d at 802-03 (English, J., concurring) (stating that the contract 
should be enforced as written); Maw v. Noble, 354 P.2d 121 ,  123 (Utah 1960). 
1 31. See Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Andrews, 67 S.W. 923, 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) 
(allowing the attorney-assignee to prosecute to judgment in the name of the assignor). 
132. See Chase, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (involving cases of a contract coupled with an inter­
est). 
1 33. Such was the case in Paula Jones's lawsuit against President Clinton. Based on the 
reported amounts involved, if Jones must pay tax on the portion of her settlement going 
towards attorneys' fees, her entire $850,000 settlement would go towards attorneys' fees and 
taxes, plus she would have to pay another $38,000 out of pocket. James Serven, The Federal 
Income Tax Treatment of Contingent Legal Fees in Personal Injury Cases, 30 COLO. LAW. 81, 
82 (2001). 
134. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 368 (5th Cir. 2000). 
1 35. See Kenseth /, supra note 10, 1 1 4  T.C. 399, 401 (2000); Ward v. Orsini, 152 N.E. 696, 
697 (N.Y. 1926); Karsten, supra note 87, at 252. 
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diverge,136 attorneys often insert clauses forbidding the client from 
compromising or settling the case without the attorney's consent.137 
Although courts generally will not allow contracts that prohibit clients 
from settling, they do allow clauses saying clients must consult their 
attorney before settling.138 Other courts allow implicit bars by permit­
ting the plaintiff's attorney to sue a defendant who settles directly with 
a plaintiff despite knowing of the contingent-fee agreement.139 Thus, 
although the client supposedly decides if a settlement has been 
reached and for how much, in reality the attorney usually makes such 
decisions. 140 
One should not, however, view control as a monolithic entity, 
incapable of being split between numerous people. The crucial ques­
tion hinges on whether the plaintiff retained enough control to attrib­
ute the portion of the award dedicated to the lawyer to the client 
also.141 Obviously, a complete assignment did not occur,142 but this fact 
does not indicate the plaintiff retained sole control.143 Plaintiffs' 
lawyers now commonly refuse to take a case on anything but a contin­
gency basis,144 and such contracts inevitably constitute adhesion 
contracts - where the courts typically view the party purchasing 
services as vulnerable and lacking options and control.145 Thus, clients 
have little control over payment methods.146 Attorney control over 
other aspects of the case becomes clear in situations where the client 
136. Painter, supra note 81, at 671-72. 
137. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 401 ; Ward, 152 N.E. at 697 (stating that the 
lawyer gets half of any settlement concluded without his consent); Karsten, supra note 87 at 
252. But see id. at 251 ("Courts decisively and consistently held contingency fee contracts 
that prohibited clients to settle to be void as contrary to public policy."). 
1 38. See Ward. 152 N.E. at 697-99 (allowing attorney to claim half of settlement because 
plaintiff settled without lawyer's consent). 
1 39. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 438 (Beghe, J., dissenting); Tex. Cent. 
R.R. Co. v. Andrews, 67 S.W. 923, 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902). But see Henslee, Monek & 
Henslee v. D.M. Cent. Transp .• Inc .. 870 F. Supp. 764, 767-68 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (refusing to 
allow contingent-fee attorney action in tort against insurance company which settled with 
client without attorney's input; any agreement barring plaintiff from settling without attor­
ney permission is void as against public policy). 
140. See Havers, supra note 124, at 626. 
1 41. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 442, 448 (Beghe, J., dissenting). 
1 42. See Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 303 (noting that this would require a complete 
divestment of control). 
143. See supra notes 1 20-124 and accompanying text. 
144. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 422 (Beghe J., dissenting); Painter, supra 
note 81, at 662-63. 
145. Cf. Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 422 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting 
contingent-fee agreement is a standard form contract without which plaintiffs attorney 
would not have represented him). 
146. See id. (Beghe, J., dissenting); Painter, supra note 81, at 662-63; Sheridan, supra 
note 42, at 300 n.139. 
1120 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101 :1102 
has little legal knowledge.147 A lawyer might file in a court of general 
jurisdiction on the chance that it will lead to a higher award when a 
court of limited jurisdiction would be better for the client's overall 
chances of recovery. 148 A lawyer may settle quickly after doing little 
work for a high hourly fee, or drag the case out in hopes of a huge 
payoff.149 A client unsophisticated in legal strategies will not even 
know such issues exist. 1 50 This list does not even consider cases where 
the lawyer manipulates the clients themselves.1 51 Some courts try to get 
around such realities by asking who the bona fide owner is, thus 
ignoring who the actual owner is. 1 52 But in the end, no matter the 
semantic intricacies, the system gives the attorney a strong financial 
interest in the claim. 1 53 Attorneys become almost a separate party, 
with their own interests and motivations. 1 54 
Faced with this difficult situation, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits 
adopted an equitable solution with a minimum of legal analysis. 1 55 
They followed the example of earlier courts, confronted with 
champerty cases, who avoided classifying the matter before them by 
declaring what categories it did not fall into. 1 56 Thus, the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits state that these cases do not implicate the anticipatory 
assignment of income doctrine and then move on from there. 1 57 Left 
147. See Miller, supra note 120, at 18 (claiming the mystique of litigation deters control). 
148. MACKINNON, supra note 123, at 201. 
149. See Havers, supra note 124, at 630 (citing MACKINNON, supra note 123, at 1 98-99). 
1 50. Cf. Painter, supra note 81, at 671 -74, 691 (claiming lawyers have an informational 
advantage over client). While such acts may be unethical, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 1 .4 ( 1983), pretending they do not occur helps no one - except the unethical 
lawyers. 
1 5 1 . See, e.g. , Schneyer, supra note 89, at 389 n.76 (discussing a study claiming New 
York personal injury lawyers tend to tell their clients the defendant offered less than they 
truly did, then later reveal this higher number as a second offer and persuade the client to 
take it (citing DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 1 10-1 1 
(1974))). 
1 52. See Drake v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 165 A.2d 452, 454 (Del. Ch. 1960) (find­
ing that claimant was the bona fide owner of a claim derailed champerty claim). Whether a 
court would make such a distinction after Frank Lyon is open to debate. See Frank Lyon Co. 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 56 1 ,  583-84 (1978) (mandating looking to the economic realities of 
a situation); see also Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Substance over Form: The Cornerstone 
of Our Tax System or a Lethal Weapon in 1he IRS's Arsenal?, 8 AKRON TAX J. 9 1 ,  92-97 
( 1991)  (detailing the Supreme Court's development of the substance over form distinction). 
1 53. See Kenseth /, supra �ote 1 0, 1 14 T.C. 399, 450 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting). 
1 54. Havers, supra note 124, at 625. 
1 55. See Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th 
Cir. 2000); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 1 1 9, 126 (5th Cir. 1959). 
1 56. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125: Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 
2000); Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857. 
1 57. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125; Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360; Estate of Clarks. 202 F.3d 
at 857. 
February 2003) Contingent-Fee Agreements 1121 
unsaid, or stated with little further attention, if not an anticipatory 
assignment of income, the transaction must be a partial assignment of 
the claim itself. 158 These federal courts find it galling to make plaintiffs 
pay taxes on the portion of their claims surrendered for the privilege 
of vindicating their rights. 159 
If, however, the plaintiff has in fact assigned a portion of the claim 
to his attorney, this assignment also has tax consequences.160 Because 
this matter ultimately turns on a tax issue, one should remember the 
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") traditionally· looks to the substaqce 
of a transaction, deeming the form utilized irrelevant to tax liability.161 
If one accepts that a partial assignment occurred, then applicable case 
law exists to deal with this situation.162 While the anticipatory assign­
ment of income doctrine does not apply, the anticipation of income 
doctrine does.163 In contingent-fee cases, the IRS should not tax the 
plaintiff on what the attorney collects because that portion of the 
claim was transferred irrevocably and forever.164 The plaintiff, as well 
as the attorney, did, however, recognize a gain when the transfer 
occurred.165 
The attorney's payment to the plaintiff for a portion of the claim 
- legal services - should trigger the same tax consequences as would 
a payment from the judgment itself.166 Though one can .think of this as 
158. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125; Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 359; Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d 
at 858. 
159. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 362 n.28 (quoting Cotnam and Estate of Clarks passages 
concerning worthlessness of the claim without an attorney and stating that the only eco­
nomic benefit of an attorney is to collect a portion of what plaintiff really deserves); Estate of 
Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126. 
160. See Kenseth /, supra note 10, 114 T.C. 399, 41 1 n.4 (2000) (maintaining that even i f  
the Sixth Circuit is correct, a taxable event has occurred); Polsky, supra note 94, at  917 
(claiming that a proper analysis includes the attorney's fee in plaintiffs gross income be­
cause of § 83). 
161. Amkraut, supra note 89, at 763. 
162. See generally Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (discussing anticipation of 
income); Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (same). 
163. See Hort, 313 U.S. at 28. 
164. While the client could conceivably get the claim back, see, e.g. , Chase v. Superior 
Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (stating plaintiff has to pay fired 
attorney at hourly rate but will get entire judgment for himself), it will not return in the 
normal course of events, cf. Evans v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 40 (1970) (placing repeated emphasis 
on the fact that the taxpayer transferred everything he had, not just the right to interest). 
While the court may in effect force the attorney to sell that portion of the claim back, the 
client will have to pay to get it back. See Chase, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Provisions for a buyback 
upon the occurrence of a given event do not prevent recognizing that a transfer occurred. 
165. See Hort, 313 U.S. at 31 (holding that transfer caused realization of gain); Cotlow v. 
Comm'r, 22 T.C. 1019, 1022 (1954) (stating that realization occurs upon the complete aliena­
tion of title to property for valuable consideration). 
166. See Hort, 313 U.S. at 31 -32 (holding that payment for early cancellation of a lease is 
treated the same as lease payments would be); Catlow, 22 T.C. at 1022 (holding that insur-
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an "in lieu of" test,167 it derives from long-established tax principles.168 
This proposal, however, presents a problem in regard to measuring the 
amount of gain realized.169 
Ill. ESTABLISHING A VALUE FOR THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
This Part argues that applying section 83 of the Internal Revenue 
Code to contingent-fee situations, while seemingly reasonable, proves 
inappropriate upon closer inspection. Section III.A concludes that sec­
tions 83 and 162 are not well suited to deal with the current dilemma. 
Section III.B disputes whether a contingent-fee agreement can be con­
sidered an unvested interest in property, thus avoiding the ambit of 
section 83 altogether. Section 111.C advocates viewing the exchange of 
a portion of the claim for legal services from a barter perspective. 
A. Section 83 Mainly Applicable to the Employee-Attorney 
The solution proposed by some scholars, to tax the transfer under 
section 83,170 would fail to adequately address the problem at hand. 
Though section 83 deals with the transfer of property for services,171 it 
was not designed for the contingent-fee situation. Section 83 deals 
with employers' payments to employees or independent contractors.172 
While this section might seem to apply at first, a careful reading of the 
language implies otherwise.173 Consider that section 83 deals mainly 
with the tax consequences of receiving income not redeemable until 
sometime in the future. 174 The main proponent of applying section 83 
ance agent who purchased other agents' rights to renewal commissions is taxed as those 
agents would be). 
167. See Hickel, supra note 1 27, at 498 (advocating applying the Raytheon "in lieu of' 
test). 
168. See Hort, 3 13  U.S. at 31 ("Where . . .  the disputed amount was essentially a substi­
tute for rental payments . . .  it must be regarded as ordinary income . . . .  "). 
169. See Hickel, supra note 127, at 495-96 (describing the difficulty ensuing because the 
cause of action does not have a definite value). 
170. Polsky, supra note 94. at 917. 8111 see Robert W. Wood, Letter to the Editor, Leave 
Section 83 out of this Mess, 89 TAX NOTES 1 187, 1 1 87-88 (Nov. 27, 2000) (claiming this would 
be a strain). 
171. l .R.C. § 83 (1999) (regarding property transferred in connection with performance 
of services). 
172 See l .R.C. § 83(a). Reading Polsky's article one rather gets the impression he thinks 
the plaintiff should be taxed under this section. Polsky, supra note 94, at 920. That is not pos­
sible. This section deals with the taxation of the employee - the lawyer - not the employer 
- the plaintiff. See l .R.C. § 83. 
· 
1 73. See I.R.C. § 83. 
1 74. See l .R.C. § 83(a). Rasmussen makes a similar error when he cites to Polsky. See 
Rasmussen, supra note 74. at 3 15- 16. He says transferors should have to include the fair 
market value of what they gave up in their own income. Id. 
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acknowledges that section 83 was meant to deal primarily with stock 
options,175 and a quick glance at the section and the accompanying 
Treasury regulations easily bears this out.176 The proposition that the 
legislative history of this section indicates it was meant to deal with all 
transfers of property for services is not well taken.177 Simply because it 
could be stretched to deal with this situation, does not make it the 
only, let alone the best, solution. 
Within section 83, · only section 83(h) deals with the tax conse­
quences to the employer making the expenditures.178 Section 83(h), in 
turn, refers the reader to section 162, where the code allows a deduc­
tion for business and trade expenses.179 If section 83 did truly apply to 
contingent-fee agreements, it would explain what the courts in the 
minority have already been doing, allowing the plaintiffs to deduct 
collection fees - in the form of attorneys' fees - from their gross 
income.180 The idea that these taxpayers can fit in under this section 
presents an extremely questionable proposition. A hobby or occa­
sional pursuit does not qualify as a trade or business.181 The suggestion 
that taxpayers can create a business by suffering harms and then 
litigating to procure judgments or settlements offers an unrealistic 
scenario at best.182 Even if the judge did accept this proposition, it ap­
pears unlikely the taxpayer could engage in this behavior frequently 
enough to meet the definition of trade or business.183 It should be 
noted, however, the courts do give trade or business under this section 
175. Polsky, supra note 94, at 919 (referring to the legislative history). 
176. See l.R.C. § 83(c)(3) (regarding sales which may give rise to suit under § 16(b) of 
the Securities and Exchange Act); Treas. Reg. § 1 .83-l (f) (1978) (listing three examples, all 
involving stock); Treas. Reg. § 1 .83-3(a)(7) (as amended in 1985) (listing five examples, all 
involving stock); Treas. Reg. § l .83-3(c)(4) (as amended in 1985) (listing five examples, all 
involving stock); Treas. Reg. § l.83-5(c) (1978) (listing four examples, all involving stock); 
Treas. Reg. § 1 .83-7 (1978) (dealing specifically with th� taxation of nonqualified stock op­
tions). 
177. Polsky, supra note 94, at 919. 
178. I .R.C. § 83(h) (2003) (dealing with deduction by employer). 
179. I.R.C. § 162 (1998). 
180. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. 399, 407 n.3 (2000) (noting that if recovery is 
received in a business setting, attorneys' fees are fully deductible). 
181. See Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 24, 36 (1987) (finding man who spent sixty 
to eighty hours a week gambling was in the trade or business of gambling); Olson, supra note 
77, at 1208-10 (sustaining IRS's contention that horse breeding operation was not a business 
because no true business would operate at such losses for such a long time, and it must there­
fore be an operation not engaged in for profit under § 183). But see id. at 1209 n.57 (saying 
taxpayers who use business-like methods will almost always be found to be in trade or busi­
ness because of good faith standard). 
182. See Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35 ("to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer 
must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity . . . .  "). 
183. See id. 
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a truly expansive definition.184 One professor even proposed that O.J. 
Simpson could subtract his legal fees resulting from the criminal and 
civil cases against him arising out of his wife's murder under section 
162. 185 
The origin of the claim test may actually apply to a number of the 
contingent fee line of cases, including Srivastava, Cotnam and Estate of 
Clarks, by allowing them in the backdoor of section 162. The origin of 
the claim test asks if the expenditure arose "in connection with the 
taxpayers' business or income producing activities rather than their 
personal activities[:)" 186 Though the Court never established an exact 
definition of business activity,187 it reads the "income producing activi­
ties" language broadly.188 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has noted 
"various courts, including the Tax Court have implicitly held that a 
taxpayer may be engaged in the trade or business of being an em­
ployee,"189 and the Seventh Circuit concluded "it is well settled that an 
employee's activities constitute a trade or business . . . .  "190 The legal 
system long ago accepted that employees engage in a trade or 
business.191 The Supreme Court considers business a comprehensive 
term, that which occupies the time, attention and labor of men.192 
Some commentators contend that courts often actually apply a 
connectedness or motive test to reach these unusual results.193 
Under such a generous reading as this, Mrs. Cotnam, Dr. 
Srivastava, and possibly the estate of Mr. Clarks could all subtract 
their legal fees from their gross income if section 83 - and thereby 
184. See id. at 33 ("If a taxpayer . . .  devotes his [full time to the] activity . . .  and it is his 
intended livelihood source . . .  basic concepts of fairness . . .  demand that his activity be re-
garded as a trade or business . . . .  "). 
185. Dorocak bases this argument on Simpson's contention that the police framed him 
because of his status as a minority celebrity. Thus, the police would be motivated by the 
goal of ruining Simpson and his trade of marketing himself as a likable personality and 
spokesperson. Defending against the criminal charges and lawsuit would constitute the only 
way to protect his trade. See John R. Dorocak, Sports and Entertainment Figures (and 
Others) May Be Able to Deduct Legal Expenses for Criminal Prosecutions (and Wrongful 
Death Suits), 13 AKRON TAX J. 1. 4-5 (1997). 
186. Edward J. Schnee & Nancy J. Stara, The Origin of the Claim Test: A Search .for 
Objectivity, 13 AKRON TAX J. 97 (1997). The origin of the claim test originated in United 
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). 
187. See Schnee & Stara, supra note 186, at 107-08. 
188. The IRS has actually characterized some people as being in a trade or business 
against their wishes. See Olson, supra note 77, at 1220-25. 
189. Steffens v. Comm'r, 707 F.2d 478, 482 (11th Cir. 1983). 
190. Groetzinger v. Comm'r, 771 F.2d 269, 276 (7th Cir. 1985). 
191. Olson, supra note 77, at 1224 & n.160. 
192. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27-28 (1987). But see Olson, supra note 77, at 
1212-13 (stating that the IRS has held profit motive alone is not enough). 
193. See Dorocak, supra note 185, at 3. 
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section 162 - applies.194 All of their suits emerged from their "trade 
or business" of .working.19� Mrs. Cotnam sued .when she was not 
bequeathed her promised share of Mr. Hunter's estate for her work as 
his attendant. 196 Dr. Srivastava's suit emerged from a local television 
investigative report of his medical practice.197 The estate of Mr. Clarks 
could possibly use section 162, depending on what capacity he was 
acting in when struck on the head while unloading his truck.1.98 This 
interpretation, while interesting, and certainly beneficial to the plain­
tiff, seems an unlikely reading, and stands little chance of being ac­
cepted by the Internal Revenue Service or the courts.199 Additionally, 
section 162(a)(l)'s requirement that salaries paid must be reasonable 
might prevent plaintiffs from utilizing this section.200 Much of the con­
troversy surrounding contingency fees and their taxation springs from 
the sometimes astronomical per hour rates.201 
B. No Substantial Risk of Forfeiture. Exists 
Another potential problem emerges in considering whether to 
apply section 83 to the situation at hand. Section 83 O:Qly applies when 
an employer offers an employee an unvested interest in property.202 
This includes situations entailing a substantial risk of forfeiture.203 
Gaining a partial assignment of a claim, however, may very well not 
fall under this heading. The text does make clear that, if the employee 
194. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 14 T.C. 399, 407 n.3 (2000) (discussing the differences 
in tax treatment in regard to businesses and individuals). 
1 95. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2000) (doctor); Estate of 
Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 855 (6th Cir. 2000) (trucker); 
Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 1 1 9, 1 20-21 (5th Cir. 1 959) (personal attendant). 
196. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 20-21 .  
197. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at  355. 
198. It is unclear from the appellate opinion whether Mt. Clarks ·was shopping at 
K-Mart in a personal capacity, making a delivery, or if he in fact worked for K-Mart. See 
Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855. The facts given in the district court opinion, however, imply 
that he was working at the time. Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, No. 
96-CV-60446-AA, 1 998 WL 839415, at *l (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 1 998). 
1 99. See Purdey v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 413, 418 (1997) (saying ordinary and neces­
sary expenses of conducting a business are deductible under § 162 unless the trade or busi­
ness consists of service performed as an employee). 
200. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(l) (1999); Robert I. Keller, The Taxation of Barter Transac­
tions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 441, 443 n.10 (1982) (discussing "reasonable allowance" for salaries 
and other compensation). 
201. See Schneyer, supra note 89, at 372 (explaining the argument that contingent fees 
produce windfalls for the lawyer); Painter, supra note 81, at 635, 652-53 (advocating regula­
tion of contingent fees to curb excessive fees); Schneiter, supra note 1 10 (stating contingent 
fee may work out to much more than a reasonable hourly fee). 
202. See I.R.C. § 83(a) ( 1999). 
203. l.R.C. § 83(a)(l). 
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must still perform substantial work before the property vests in him, 
then a substantial r.isk of forfeiture exists.204 But the Treasury regula­
tions explain that a nonlapsing condition does not represent a substan­
tial risk of forfeiture if such forfeiture would occur only if the em­
ployer discharged the employee for cause.205 Some imply that if 
leaving voluntarily would cause a forfeiture, there is a substantial risk 
of forfeiture as envisioned by section 83.206 Treasury Regulation sec­
tion 1.83-3(c)(2), however, states that if an employee must return the 
property upon accepting a job with a competing firm, this possibility 
will generally not qualify as a substantial risk of forfeiture.207 By exten­
sion, if the employee only loses the property because of a voluntary 
resignation, for any reason before vestment, this should not qualify as 
a substantial risk of forfeiture.208 
Once the attorney and client sign the contingent-fee agreement, a 
substantial risk of forfeiture no longer exists.209 The law barring poten­
tial plaintiffs from assigning their claims to attorneys developed 
because policy makers judged it unwise to give lawyers that level of 
control over a claim.210 Applying section 83, however, indicates an 
acceptance of the proposition that such an assignment did occur. To 
then turn around and then argue a substantial risk of forfeiture exists 
seems, at the least, inconsistent. If clients fire their lawyers for 
anything but cause, the courts wilt order reimbursement of either the 
entire contingent fee specified in the contract, or at the very least at an 
hourly rate.2 1 1  And if the court decides to base its decision on whether 
a substantial amount of work was still required, this would necessitate 
a case-by-case analysis. Although ethical rules often prohibit taking 
cases .on a contingent-fee basis when the case will require very little 
work and when such an arrangement is clearly not in the client's best 
204. l .R.C. § 83(c)( l )  (1999). 
205. Treas. Reg. § l .83-3(c)(2) (as amended in 1985). 
206. See Polsky, supra note 94, at 921 . 
207. Treas. Reg. § l .83-3(c)(2). 
208. Cf. id. (stating that a chance of voluntary departure does not constitute a substan­
tial risk of forfeiture). 
209. Amkraut refers to this as a limited risk of forfeiture. Amkraut, supra note 89 at 763 
n.88. 
2 10. See id. at 751-52 
·
(recounting common law concerns about lawyers owning their 
clients' claims). 
211. See Chase v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1 962); 
Phelps v. Elgin, 1 84 N.E.2d 799, 802-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (English, J., concurring); Maw v. 
Noble, 354 P.2d 121 ,  123 (Utah 1 960). One could argue that if the lawyer cannot collect the 
entire contingent fee and must settle for her normal hourly rate instead, she did not truly 
receive an assignment of a part of the claim. In fact, this pay discrepancy lies at the heart of 
some courts' decisions insisting on enforcing the contingent-fee agreement and refusing to 
calculate judgments based on an hourly rate. See Phelps, 184 N.E.2d at 802-03 (English, J., 
concurring) (advocating contract enforcement over a quantum meruit approach). 
February 2003] Contingent-Fee Agreements 1127 
interest,212 not all lawyers walk the straight and narrow in this 
regard.213 With an individual analysis, the claim could vest immediately 
upon signing for cases requiring very little work, or well into trial 
preparation for cases necessitating more work. Despite all this, the 
fact remains that the lawyers will collect a fee in all cases except where 
they quit or are discharged for cause.214 
C. Barter Analysis: The Better Approach 
The case against using section 83 to approach the tax repercussions 
of contingent-fee agreements becomes even clearer when one consid­
ers that an alternative method more closely fits the facts and allows for 
a middle ground. The Internal Revenue Service already requires those 
engaged in barter exchanges to count their increase in wealth as 
income.215 This describes exactly what occurs when plaintiffs exchange 
a share in their claim for legal services.216 After the exchange, the 
plaintiffs have legal representation and the lawyers have the right to 
press the claim and collect a portion of the proceeds.217 Internal 
Revenue Code section lOOl(b) requires taxpayers to report the fair 
market value of services provided in exchange for property.218 
While many rightly claim the tax code can make no claims to fair­
ness,219 a barter approach can remove some of the inequities of other 
approaches in this instance.220 No convincing reason exists to link the 
212. See Havers, supra note 124, at 629 (citing Model Code of Professional Responsibil­
ity § 2-106(A) barring "clearly excessive fees"); cf Schneyer, supra note 89, at 407 (discuss­
ing cases which pose no genuine risk of nonrecovery). 
213. See Havers, supra note 124, at 628-29 (claiming that many cases where the outcome 
is not in doubt involve high contingency fees). 
214. If they quit for cause, they could very well bring a restitution suit. 
215. See l.R.C. § 61(a) (1999); Treas. Reg. § 1 .61-2(d) (as amended in 1992) (dealing 
with services paid for with property). 
216. Rev. Ru!. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 outlines the general requirements for reporting 
barter income. 
217. Karsten, supra note 87, at 231. 
218. I.R.C. § lOOl(b) (1999). 
219. "Not to appear humorous or flip, but if these were equitable proceedings, the un­
dersigned doubts the government could ever win because some might never view the tax 
structure as equitable." Riverton Inv. Corp. v. United States, 5:99CV00089, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20770, at *23 (W.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2000). Justice Blackmun in Groetzinger wrote, 
"basic concepts of fairness (if there be much of that in the income tax law) . . .  " Comm'r v. 
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 33 (1987). Another snide court has observed, "common sense and 
the tax law are rarely even waving acquaintances." Skoglund v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 833 
(1982). 
220. Many would not agree, claiming the tax code can only achieve horizontal equity if 
plaintiffs who hire lawyers on a contingency basis receive the same treatment in the tax 
system as those who pay an hourly rate. See, e.g. , Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 317. In tax 
law, however, form can matter greatly when it comes to qualifying for deductions. See 
Bernard J. Grant, III, Recent Development, No Taxation Withollt Realization: Srivastava v. 
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values of the two things being exchanged, unless establishing value in 
a more realistic manner proves impractical.221 When the government 
can independently value the gain of each party, it should use the actual 
gain each received.222 Such a solution holds particular appeal in a legal 
setting once a court renders a verdict. "Reliance on the value of the 
property given up as the sole and conclusive evidence of the value of 
the property received should clearly be limited to cases where the 
value of the property received cannot be reasonably ascertained in 
other ways."223 
Contingent-fee arrangements often charge clients an exorbitant 
rate.224 If the barterer lacks knowledge in the area in which the barter 
arises, this detracts from the rationale of using his or her valuation of 
the transaction for tax purposes.225 The case law supports this senti­
ment as well, with the courts placing much emphasis on the fair 
market value of the services provided - not what the parties actually 
paid.226 
Because the Internal Revenue Service can easily determine how 
much each party actually benefited, these gains should represent the 
amount of reportable income. Attorneys obviously will have to report 
as income whatever their portion of the judgment was.227 Then the 
Internal Revenue Service should determine whether these amounts 
were the clients' actual gains. At this point, an objective method exists 
Commissioner, the Fijih Circuit's Answer to Tax Treatment of Attorney's Fees Under a 
Contingency Fee Agreement, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 363, 364 (2001 ). Those who view 
contingent-fee plaintiffs and hourly-fee plaintiffs as similarly situated have a strange notion 
of similar. First, lawyers in many fields simply refuse to take a case on an hourly basis. Sec­
ond, anyone who can afford an attorney at an hourly rate is by no means similarly situated to 
those forced to use contingent-fee lawyers. Finally, if the wealthy believe giving up 30-50% 
of their award to a lawyer produces tax benefits justifying the cost, they should not have any 
trouble finding a lawyer to accommodate them. 
221. Keller, supra note 200, at 446-47, 453 (statirig that both parties should look to the 
value of what they received as opposed to what they gave up). This has justly been called a 
circular exercise because no real reason exists for applying the value of one thing exchanged 
over the value of the other when determining the tax rate for the exchange. Id. at 455. See 
also Amerada Hess Corp. v. Comm'r, 517 F.2d 75, 88 (3rd Cir. 1975) (noting "obvious dan­
gers in evaluating the consideration involved in one side of a barter by determining the 
worth of the consideration on the other side"). 
222. See Keller, supra note 200, at 446-47, 453-54. 
223. Id. at 454. 
224. See Schneyer, supra note 89, at 372. 
225. Keller, supra note 200, at 455. But see Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 ,  1454 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that the "fee arrangement signifies the value that the parties placed 
on attorney's services"). 
226. See, e.g. , Badell v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 (2000). 
227. See l .R.C. § 61(a) (1999). 
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to find out.228 If the attorneys kept track of their billable hours on the 
case, as most will in the hope attorney's fees will be awarded, the 
clients' actual gains can be measured.229 In many cases, the figure will 
represent a much lower amount than what the attorney actually re­
ceived.230 The clients' tax liabilities should rest on this.231 The value of 
what the plaintiffs gave up, though easier to ascertain, provides little 
value in determining their gain.232 The contingent-fee agreement trans­
fers a portion immediately.233 Nothing, however, bars uncoupling the 
parties' gains and measuring them at the time a court renders a judg­
ment.234 Professor Keller specifically advocates a rule of valuation of 
what the barterers would have paid in cash if they had used cash.235 
One need not stretch to believe if clients were paying in advance, or 
at least at an hourly rate, they would pay much less than what a 
contingent-fee lawyer eventually gains.236 
The Internal Revenue Service should tax plaintiffs on the amount 
they actually received from their attorneys in exchange for a portion 
of their claims. If an attorney charges $250 per hour and spent 100 
hours on the case, the client received a benefit of $25,000.237 To argue 
that because the attorney actually receives one million dollars that this 
amount was the benefit to his client borders on the absurd.238 It also 
demonstrates that a partial assignment occurred.239 Otherwise the 
228. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 277 (1998) (indicating that contingent-fee lawyers keep 
track of their billable hours). 
229. See id. at 282 (finding that thirty-nine of forty-three contingent-fee lawyers had the 
information necessary to estimate effective hourly rate - including billable hours). 
230. "Experience tells us that a presumption of equality is simply not appropriate in 
many barter transactions. Often one side outbargains the other and in no sense can it be said 
the two sides of the exchange are equal." Keller, supra note 200, at 452 n.49. 
231. Cf Badell, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) at 424 (using fair market value of services received). 
232. See Keller, supra note 200, at 446-47. 
233. See Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857-58 
(6th Cir. 2000); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1959); Painter, supra note 81, 
at 640. 
234. See Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2000) (relating IRS request 
that court apply the open transaction doctrine from Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931 ), to 
a case where Cotnam will apply). 
235. Keller, supra note 200, at 455-56. 
236. See Joel S. Newman, Determining Value in Barter Transactions: A Response to 
Robert Keller's The Taxation of Barter Transactions, 68 MINN. L. REV. 711, 713 (1984) 
(claiming that most barter services "are items that could not have been sold for cash, or cer­
tainly not for a cash price the seller would have accepted"). 
237. Schneyer would adjust the benefit upward based on the chances of recovery at the 
time the case was taken - sound theory but difficult to implement in practice. See Schneyer, 
supra note 89, at 396. 
238. See Keller, supra note 200, at 446-47 (arguing that both parties should look to the 
value of what they received). 
239. See Painter, supra note 81, at 674. 
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"owner" of the claim could dismiss the attorney on the eve of 
victory.24° Courts do not allow this because they realize in a suit 
for restitution, the attorney would lose $975,000.241 The attorney 
outbargained the client. For the government to tax plaintiffs, not on 
the fair market value of what they received, but on the fair market 
value of what they gave up, adds insult to injury. 
CONCLUSION 
The circuits disagree about the propriety of allowing plaintiffs to 
assign a portion of their claim to an attorney. These concerns consti­
tute a historical artifact, the pressing issues of the Middle Ages 
gumming up the judicial machinery of the twenty-first century. 
Recognizing that lawyers largely control the course and outcome of 
suits and settlements will allow courts to respond to the reality of the 
situation instead of how they think the system should work. Partial 
assignments of the claim already exist, and to call them a lien on the 
judgment changes nothing. The government allegedly levies taxes on 
the fair market value of what the taxpayer receives. Here, taxpayers 
receive legal services in exchange for a part of their claim and should 
have to pay taxes on this amount. The taxpayers do not, nor will they 
ever, receive the full portion going to the attorney. The fact they once 
had a right to this amount does not change the reality they will never 
realize the gain. Esau sold his birthright to Jacob for a pottage of 
lentils.242 Esau should have been taxed on the value of the lentils 
received, while Jacob should have been taxed based on the value of 
Isaac's estate. 
240. See Painter, supra note 8 1 , at 674 n.223 (discussing clients who discharge their at· 
torneys "on the courthouse steps"). 
241. See id. (noting that in such situations the quantum meruit award should equal the 
agreed upon fee). 
242. Genesis 25: 29-34. 
